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The incorporation of immigrants into society has become more difficult as the 
composition of immigrants has changed, as well as native citizens’ increasingly 
demanding criteria for assimilation have become more intense. Over the last few decades, 
governments have responded by revising their naturalization requirements and changing 
their immigration policies. Currently, the outlook on immigrants assimilating is grim. 
Immigrants migrate for different reasons, but when they are confronted with poor living 
conditions, discrimination and a lack of government support they become less likely to 
undertake naturalization—a necessary step in assimilation. Approximately 3.1 percent of 
the world’s population lives outside their country of origin (United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Economic	   and	   Social	   Affairs	   [UN	   DESA], 2009); however, an additional 13 percent, 
according to a 2009 Gallup Poll, desired to permanently reside outside their native 
countries. It is not a myth that the most sought after countries to immigrate to are affluent 
western democracies, i.e., the United States, Canada, nations in the European Union 
(EU), Australia, and New Zealand, among others.  In the aforementioned Gallup Poll, of 
the 259, 542 respondents, 30.5 percent would like to move to North America—overall 25 
percent to the United States alone, and an additional 30 percent of respondents desire to 
live within the European Union. (Espinova & Ray, 2009).   
The number of individuals migrating over the last ten years has increased from 
150 million in 2000 to, roughly, 214 million today. This resulted in a signaling to 
prosperous countries that immigration will not be slowing. Immigration to the member 
states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reached 
91 million foreign nationals in 2005, while 43 percent of the migration entering OECD 
countries came from other OECD countries (Widmaier & Dumont, 2011). This clearly 
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demonstrates that regulating the inflow of migrants proves to be just as difficult. Even 
with development aid and growth in the economies of poor and developing countries, the 
reality of the free market economy is that there always will be winners and losers. While 
there are many that may wish to relocate for better economic stability, to reunite with 
family members or to escape persecution and violence, they may find that they not be 
able to due to their lack of fiscal and human capital or denied requests for asylum, 
individuals motivations for emigrating vary, signifying there is no single root cause 
(Terrazas, 2011). The international community has been seeing a change in the 
composition and treatment of immigrants. 
With the release of the OECD’s 2013 edition of the International Migration 
Outlook, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría published his remarks on the new 
publication, in which he highlighted some of the more prominent findings on current 
immigration patterns. During the most recent recession, there were three years during 
which immigration flows modestly declined; however, since 2011 there has been a 2 
percent increase in immigration to OECD countries, primarily due to an overall 15 
percent increase in immigration to Europe in 2011 alone. There is great optimism that 
new national and supranational policies, such as is the European Union’s ‘Blue Card’ 
Directive, will attract more highly-skilled and highly educated immigrants into OECD 
member states (Europa, 2009). Despite the progress, immigrants still face discrimination 
in the labor force, as well as, higher unemployment rates than native-born citizens. For 
example, on OCD members in 2011, on average, encountered a 5 percent increase in 
immigrant unemployment compared to a 3 percent increase for natives-born citizens 
(Gurría, 2013).  
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As a greater number of people want to immigrate abroad, particularly to wealthier 
countries, governments struggle to balance the large influx of immigration applications 
with the wishes and demands of their citizens. That is not to say that citizens truly know 
what is best for a country; for example, in any given country there is a segment of the 
population that believes immigrants are a burden to society and hurt the economy. 
Through empirical studies, these claims have been tested and the results have been 
proven to be divided, at best. On one hand, Borjas’s study in 2003 shows that low-skilled, 
low-educated immigrants have a negative effect on the wages of both previous 
immigrants and native workers. On the other hand, it has also been shown that these 
effects are minor and contribute very to the wages of previous immigrant and native 
workers (Card, 2005; Ottaviano & Peri, 2006). It is typically the native-born, low-
educated blue-collar workers who feel most threatened by immigrants, and thus wish to 
restrict immigration (OECD, 2010).  However, regulating the flow of immigrants is not 
the only challenge faced by governments today, many governments must also contend 
with effectively assimilating the immigrants already present into the population at-large.  
The process by which countries incorporate immigrants into their mainstream 
culture has been extensively written about over the last two decades.  While some 
countries have an easier time incorporating their immigrants into the native population, it 
depends on a variety factors. It may not always be the case that some countries’ 
institutions are better suited to the task and their native populations are more welcoming 
than others, but rather it may be that the ease of assimilation depends on the composition 
of the foreign nationals. Some countries receive their largest percentages of immigrants 
from countries culturally similar to their own, as is the case with Austria receiving its 
5	  
highest number of migrants from Germany, or neighboring countries, with which they 
share the same language, such as in the case of the UK, receiving its largest immigrant 
populations from Ireland, Australia and the United States; or in Switzerland, where three 
of the four official languages are used by their immigrant populations from Italy, 
Germany and France (OECD, 2013). Moreover, the genealogical and cultural similarities 
between these groups suggest those immigrants would be inclined to have Christian and 
democratic values and moral codes. The native population typically has the most 
outspoken opinion on whether or not immigrant populations have successfully been 
assimilated, which is determined according to terms set by the natives. Studies point out 
several criteria that natives wish to see immigrants display to prove their assimilation: 
effective use of official language, recognition and acceptance of culture, lifestyle, and 
traditions, participation in the work force and community, and becoming a citizen of the 
country (Alba & Nee, 1997; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Antonsich 2012). 
The question arise that if given the current domestic systems, will naturalization 
and incorporation be enough to prove to natives that first generation immigrants are 
succeeding assimilating to the native culture? I seek to show that the demands for and 
expectations of assimilation by the native populations of the host countries are too high 
given the limited resources that governments provide immigrants. To close, I will explore 
the current literature and theories, public opinions (through previous research), social 
surveys like the European Social Survey and the World Social Survey, citizenship laws 
and available programs, and the trends of immigrant resentment, tension and 
discrimination in western societies. Finally, I will try to explain, why, in light of all these 
data, meeting society’s assimilation and the country’s naturalization requirements, 
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immigrants still struggle to prove to the native population that they have successfully 
assimilated.  
 
I. Natives’ High Demands concerning Assimilation and an Exploration into the Data 
on Public Opinion of Immigrants provided by Social Surveys 
 
Reactions to immigrants fall on wide continuum, from ‘we need stricter migration 
policy, deport them!’ and ‘immigrants are taking all our benefits’ to ‘open our borders so 
we can invite more in!’ and ‘immigrants strengthen our economy!’. Whereas 
governments regulate and sometimes provide sources for immigrant incorporation, the 
native population judges the process, and through public polls, voices their opinions. 
Governments are required to balance the public’s opinions, the demands of the business 
sector and economy, and the incorporation of immigrants. Immigration policy typically 
tries to realistically meet the demands from the market, while protecting the wishes of its 
citizens. Countries continuously adjust the number of admissions granted by type of 
immigrant—temporary worker, student, reunified family member, among others—and 
there has been a recent trend to tighten restrictions on asylum seekers. The number of 
countries to which one must swear an oath after naturalization has increased over the last 
few decades, and some countries impose compulsory language and culture classes while 
others require certification to a certain level in the official language. These are just some 
examples of how governments work to satisfy the immigration concerns within their 
borders. An important yet less frequently discussed topic is the public opinions on how 
migrants should incorporate themselves into the host country.  Over the last decade there 
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has been significant research into the incorporation strategies, the perception of migrants 
by the majority, and the demands that majority cultures in western democracies make 
regarding the incorporation of immigrants.  
Due to the post World War II economic boom in many developed countries, 
governments mass-recruited workers without any formal implementation of migration or 
incorporation policies, or in the case of the United States, without a true enforcement of 
the borders until the 1980s (Ireland, 2004; Zolberg & Long, 1999). In terms of 
incorporation doctrine, the period between the 1960s until the mid to late 1970s is 
described as a period of assimilation, where migrants were expected to forsake their own 
traditions, cultural and social behaviors and be absorbed into the new culture. This 
usually involved adapting to a new way of life, adopting a new attitude, language and 
values (Alba & Nee, 1997; Antonsich, 2012).   
Multiculturalism took root during the 1970s as a new way to incorporate 
migrants.  At its core is the expectation that the state should be tolerant of different 
cultures within its borders and that this diversity should be equally protected. 
Multiculturalism seeks to create policy and practice that gives equal attention to the 
cultural needs of minority communities. It does so by guaranteeing representation in the 
state’s legislative bodies, funding for ethnic education systems or bilingual education in 
schools, and even extending rights to religious communities. In return, immigrants are 
expected to respect the countries basic, legal, cultural, social rules. Critics of 
multiculturalism argue that there is a lack of reciprocity, in that the state unilaterally 
provides rights, benefits and means of incorporation, but the immigrant groups 
voluntarily segregate themselves (Sartori, 2000; Joppke, 2001).  
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The 1990s mark the return and revamping of the practices of assimilation.  
Brubaker distinguishes the usage of assimilation today by understanding the core 
meaning. In the earlier, transitive usage: to make or treat similarly—or in a biological 
sense, to absorb—assimilation is the absorption of migrants into the new culture. He 
argues, however, that today’s usage is actually the intransitive meaning ‘to become 
similar’ where the emphasis is on the process by which assimilation occurs (Brubaker, 
2001). In a related, new theory of assimilation, commonly called neo-assimilation theory,  
(Alba & Nee, 1997), there is an emphasis on the role that institutions play in the 
assimilation process. Incorporation practices today differ today from earlier models of 
incorporation because in general, countries do not adopt only one doctrine over the other. 
They instead have characteristics of both multiculturalism and assimilation, and reflect 
the wishes of their citizens, the demands of the market, and the attempt to mitigate the 
influx of immigration. These models usually rely on a mutual, as opposed to one-way, 
incorporation processes, where the government provide some support and resources for 
integration and immigrants are expected to accept and respect the laws and culture.  
Similarly, no two countries’ incorporation regimens are the same (Brubaker, 
2001). Many have similarities in one sphere, such as the type of immigrant they recruit, 
but have opposing programs in another, like whether they provide social rights to 
migrants.  Three instances in Europe in the last decade display how different countries 
and the EU handle the integration of Islamic migrants. In 1995 the German Constitutional 
Court ruled that crucifixes or any Christian relic could not be displayed in public schools, 
as non- or other-religion students should not have to learn “under the cross”, whereas the 
European court of Human Rights in Lautsi vs. Italy (2011) ruled that the crucifix was not 
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a religious relic, but a symbol of the national culture and identity (Joppke & Torpey, 
2013).  France, on the other hand, in an attempt to validate their secular values, passed a 
law to take all religious symbols out of public schools, which meant no head scarves for 
female Muslim students. In 2010, France banned all face coverings in public places, 
which included the veil-portion of the burqa, which led to serious riots in France shortly 
after it was passed in the National Assembly.   
A 2010 study by the OECD researched on public opinions and migration using 
Social Survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) Rounds 1-4, the World Social 
Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). In the first stage they 
took into account demographic variables, political orientation, highest achieved level of 
education, the labor market and the spatial or heritable proximity to migrants.  The 
second stage included the determinants of preferences on the economic, political and 
economic variables from the first stage. With this data viewed against a series of 
immigration themed questions, they were able to more clearly understand people’s 
perception of immigrants and their impact on economy and cultural life, (OECD 2010). 
This study found that “respondents demand more in terms of economic or cultural 
benefits from immigrants of a different ethnic origin than from those of a similar one”, 
for example, respondents from France, the UK and German demand greater benefits from 
immigration to accept a more open migration policy (OEDC, 2010; 131).  
On average, Nordic states have had less immigration than most countries for 
several reasons: they did not have colonies like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
and France, and their location and isolation make them more difficult to reach for low-
skilled migrants of low-economic means. These countries’ significantly fewer encounters 
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with migration as a whole may account for their more inclusive policies, and responses to 
survey questions. When asked if migrants have a positive impact on culture, over 70 
percent of respondents from Finland, and Sweden, and approximately 69 percent from the 
Netherlands responded favorably. In contrast, in a survey comparing opinion scores of 21 
European countries in order to determine the countries’ most important immigrant 
criteria, every country except Poland rated “the immigrant’s commitment to the country’s 
way of life” first, then “the immigrant having the work skills the country needs” followed 
by “the immigrant’s close family is living in the country”. The 2013 International 
Migration Outlook country breakdowns show the positive relationship of public opinion 
and the breakdown of the inflow of migrants into European countries. European countries 
either had a majority ‘free movement’—referring to the Schengen Zone, which allows 
citizens of the EU member states free movement and visa-free residency up to three 
months without registering with local authorities—or they had closer percentages, 
creating mixture of  ‘Free Movement’, ‘Work’, and/or ‘Family Reunification’: 
• ‘ Free movement’: Germany (67.9 percent of the inflow), Austria (65.5 percent), 
Norway (63.8 percent) Netherlands (58.3 percent) 
• Mixtures:  
o France: 39.9 percent Family and 33.7 percent Free movement; 
o Italy: 33 percent Work, 28 percent Family, 35 percent Free Movement; 
o Spain: 38.9 percent Work and 42.6 percent Free Movement; 
o Sweden: 37.7 percent Family and 38 percent Free Movement 38 percent; 
o UK: 35 percent Work and 22.6 percent Free Movement (OECD, 2010).  
11	  
Moving forward, the general conclusion drawn from the OECD study is that the 
belief that immigration has a positive impact on culture, the economy, leads to favoring a 
more open immigration policy. Other important factors are age, education, state of the 
economy and work environment, and granting social rights to immigrants. The surveys 
show that the older a respondent is, the more likely they will have negative feelings about 
immigrants, economically and culturally. One explanation of these feelings could be 
attributed to the perception of how benefits are distributed. As older citizens are more 
dependent on pensions and government assistance, believing that immigrants are 
receiving already scarce benefits would lead these citizens to support a restriction on 
immigration.  Other reasons could be length of exposure to, previous resentful feelings 
for, or politics toward migrants. The data provided about gender is not consistent. 
Whereas women are more apt to support increased migration of different ethnicities, they 
also are more likely to have negative feelings towards immigrants when considering the 
economic impacts.  
Higher skilled and educated individuals favor more open immigration policy, 
whereas the lower skilled and educated are more likely to be in favor of restrictions. This 
result is seen in ESS, WVS and ISSP data, and a considerable amount of literature is 
available that finds education level is an important determinate on natives’ opinions of 
migrants. Furthermore, in occupations and industries, where there is heavy competition 
with migrants, are less supportive of immigrants and vice versa (Otega & Polavieja, 
2009). Highly skilled, highly educated natives may not even be confronted with as much 
migrant competition, and therefore do not see immigrants as a threat. Data from 2005 
shows that 30 percent of highly skilled, highly educated migrants work in jobs for which 
12	  
they are overqualified (Widmaier & Dumond, 2011). The reason for the lack in 
competition from those highly skilled immigrants largely has to do with the 
transferability of university and tertiary degrees from foreign countries, the perception 
that the quality of the education may not be as distinguished, and the fact that the 
immigrants’ language abilities may not be sufficient to work in their ideal careers.  
The research conducted by Hainmueller & Hiscox suggests that education level 
and skill level are synonymous, and opinions on immigration have less to do with the 
competition for jobs than with the difference in cultural values. They also suggest that the 
employment and income of immigrants only minutely affects the economy. More 
educated citizens are less racist and find cultural diversity to be valuable (Hainmueller & 
Hiscox, 2007). There is also a higher incidence of anti-immigrant sentiment among EU 
citizens who show evidence of prejudice towards minorities and immigrants, political 
conservatism, and skepticism concerning the European Union (Kessler & Freeman, 
2007).  
A quarter of the respondents from Nordic countries, like Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden (30 percent, 26 percent, 36 percent respectively) are most supportive of the idea 
of granting rights to immigrants immediately, without any prior contributions. Whereas 
nearly half of the respondents from Hungary, Slovenia Poland and the Netherlands (65 
percent, 58 percent, 48 percent, 47 percent respectively) believe eligibility should be 
reliant on citizenship and some even suggest it be restricted to native-born citizen only. 
Citizens who rely on benefits are more likely to favor restrictions on migrants’ access to 
them, as they want less competition for their benefits (OECD, 2010).  
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 In asking native participants about whether they believe migrants are a positive 
impact on the economy, only Norway and Switzerland responded with 50 percent 
agreement, while the country with the lowest agreement was Hungary, which had well 
below 20 percent (OECD, 2010). Countries with higher per capita Gross Domestic 
Products (GDP) are on average less open to migration, as better off countries typically 
have a higher flow of immigrants, and the migrants tend to be less skilled and educated 
than the natives (Mayda, 2006). Having a large proportion of unskilled, less educated 
migrants concentrated in certain industries will result in more dissatisfaction of the native 
workers who typically work in those industries. There additionally is clear association 
between immigration flows, economic conditions and anti-immigrant sentiments. When 
the economy worsens, and there is a presence of migrants, then there is a call for 
immigrant restrictions (Kessler & Freeman, 2005). 
Having discussed the trends of natives’ general opinions of and thoughts on 
immigrants, the next step is to discuss what majorities believe is the best way to prove 
assimilation into their societies. In general it is expected that immigrants must be able to 
effectively communicate in the host country’s official language, must be productive, 
proactive and participating members of society and the work force, must accept and abide 
by the host country’s laws and customs and must intend to become a citizens 
(Huntington, 2004; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Antonsich, 2012). In Paxton and Mughan’s 
research on designing an assimilation threat scale, they specified their belief that natives 
were not threatened by individual immigrants, but by immigrant groups’ failure to 
assimilate into their culture.  
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Majority populations in western democracies emphasize the importance of 
learning the host countries’ official languages, or, for some countries, Canada and 
Switzerland for example, the official language spoken in the region in which one 
migrates. Language is the easiest way to understand the basics of a culture. By having an 
understanding and grasp of the language spoken in a new country, it ensures the ability to 
discuss one’s needs, desires, and ambitions with natives. It further allows one to be more 
productive and efficient in the labor force, and also, allows one to start building 
relationships within the community. As for participation in the community, language is 
the key that starts the process to understanding a new culture. Languages are full of 
idioms and phrases that find their meanings in old wives tales and stories; they connect 
generations and, like organisms, are constantly evolving. Even when learning a new 
language, the native language is still retained. Only in the future generations of migrant 
origin do we see a gradual loss of the native tongue. The acquisition of more than one 
language is also quite common in most elementary and secondary school programs.  
Another serious debate about languages concerns when and where it is 
appropriate to speak the native versus newly acquired language. Some natives believe 
that immigrants should be allowed to speak their native language at home, while others 
believe migrants should speak the host countries’ language all the time (Paxton & 
Mughan, 2006). Mastering new languages takes immense practice and full immersion. As 
an adult, because the brain is fully developed, one learns languages at a slower rate than 
children. Reading and writing may be a good way to start getting comfortable with a new 
language, unfortunately this passive learning leads to the use of dictionaries and grammar 
books as a crutch. Speaking forces students of a new language out of their comfort zone 
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by making them react, forcing them to think more quickly and to answer in a timely 
manner. Native speakers also appreciate non-native speakers more and them better when 
they are actively engaged in what they are trying to communicate. Speaking the new 
language at home gives everyone greater possibility for practicing in a safe environment. 
Since children will be exposed to the new language in their new schools, they will 
become quickly acquainted with it and will be able to help their family members. When 
immigrants become more advanced in the language, it ensures that their children will be 
even better prepared for school. There is no doubt that without well developed language 
skills, school becomes more difficult, children perform worse in classes, and they cannot 
build strong relationships with their native peers, forcing the migrant children into the 
out-group comprised of other immigrant children, where they build relationships within 
that group. 
Natives perceive adult migrants who stick to their enclaves and do not often 
venture out into society negatively. Natives typically believe that by voluntarily 
excluding themselves from the dominant culture, minorities push themselves further 
away and are ultimately refusing to be part of the country’s identity. The loyalty to ones 
cultural heritage is not the issue; rather it is the disregard of allegiance to the new country 
(Joppke, 2001), with special concern for the blatant lack of trying. Socially integrating, 
for example, by making friends with or marrying a native, improves the likeliness that an 
immigrant will naturalize (Hochman, 2011).  
 Immigrants who are believed to be productive in the community, in their 
employment (or their search for it) and in the acquisition of education either for 
themselves or their children, are seen as further along in the assimilation process. In the 
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United States, having a job and being a hard worker are positive assimilation 
characteristics because Americans identify themselves with work-oriented values. Having 
those qualities is generally looked at positively as signs of embracing the American 
culture. However that does come with a qualification. Having a job and being a hard 
worker may be good qualities, but Americans also value education as the best way to 
improve one’s current economic, financial, and intellectual circumstances. One huge 
difference Americans notice in Asian and Indian immigrants in comparison to Hispanic 
immigrants is the value that they place on education (Huntington, 2004; Paxton & 
Mughan, 2006). Both groups are perceived as hard workers, but the Asian and Indian 
communities have much more profound devotion to furthering their education. 
Additionally, a good education leads to higher probability of a stable job, and migrants 
with steady jobs have higher naturalization rates (Hochman, 2011).  
  Another demand natives make is for immigrants to accept, respect, and 
appreciate their host country’s and society’s laws, culture and values (Antonsich, 2012). 
For countries that do not practice the purist multiculturalism, local state and federal laws 
are held above all common religious laws, and exceptions are rarely made. The  migrnts’ 
respect and acceptance of culture and values can be displayed in learning the small 
gestures and manners of the host country, such as holding the door open for someone, 
leaving a 15 percent-20 percent gratuity in restaurants for American waiters, or being 
hard-working and ambitious.  
Culture appreciation helps assimilate migrants into the society and can induce 
new behaviors that mirror the natives. Individuals, who wear the traditional dress of their 
native country seem “out of place” and are notably different. Many believe that “diversity 
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must, instead be confined to the private sphere”(Antonsich, 2012; 70).  In 2004 the 
National Assembly in France banned any religious symbols from public schools, 
provided by the school or student. Thus under that law headscarves could not be worn by 
Muslim children. Six years later, with the passing of the law banning the adornment of 
any face coverings in public, riots broke out from Muslims as the law included any burqa 
that shielded the face.  
The final demand is that immigrants should strive for naturalization. By the legal 
point at which immigrants can naturalize, natives want immigrants to associate being in 
the country with a sense of belonging and identity and share in the loyalty and attachment 
to it with all other citizens. However, due to the increases in undocumented migration, 
natives have become fixated on the legal status of migrants. Migrants, legal or not, are 
often stereotyped as undocumented migrants, who are viewed as freeloaders and are 
easily turned into the scapegoats in economic downturns. This scapegoating and other 
forms of discrimination does indeed lower odds of naturalization.  
 Becoming a naturalized citizen is not the end point of assimilation, especially in 
the eyes of the natives.  Many of the Europeans who Antonsich’s interviewed believe that 
assimilation is a gradual, inevitable phenomenon—that given a long period of time, a 
migrant will gradually become part of the community. Contemporary immigrants are 
assimilating faster than their predecessors; however, the degree to which immigrants 
assimilate depends on their countries of origin (Vigdor, 2008). In one of Antonsich’s 
interviews, an Italian male representative of an industrial association spoke of the north 
bound migration of southern Italians looking for jobs during the 1950s;  
  “…when hundreds of [Italian] southerners were arriving at the train station ... yes, 
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they were still Italians, but at the time the terrone [derogative term for southern 
Italians] was really perceived as an alien in places like Como…Well, nobody thinks 
of it anymore. They integrated and they are perceived as normal Comaschi [people 
from Como]. At that time there was a big industrial push . . . but I still remember 
local people in the bars complaining about terroni who shout too much, who are dirty 
. . . the same narrow mentality which applies today against the extra-comunitari 
[migrants from outside the EU]” (Antonsich, 2012; 66-67). 
 
II. Migration policies, citizenship laws, resources available to migrants 
 
Over the past thirty years, naturalization in western democracies has become less 
restrictive as countries have eased some requirements, such as reducing the number of 
years migrants must have legally resided in a country. Several countries relaxed their jus 
sanguinis policies, or “citizenship by blood”. A notable example is Germany, in which, 
children had only received citizenship from German-born citizens. Currently, children 
now can be awarded citizenship if at least one of the parents is a legal permanent resident 
and has resided in Germany for at least eight years. However, in easing such criteria and 
making citizenship more obtainable to immigrants, other, more demanding requirements, 
such as minimum language proficiency requirements, knowledge about the country’s 
culture and laws, renunciation of former nationalities, and oath to the new country were 
added. For many countries, these new requirements are proof that the assimilation 
demands of the native population are being fulfilled. The OECD finds that, on average,  
more immigrants are becoming eligible for citizenship in their new countries of 
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residence, and  more immigrants are naturalizing. In 2011, 18.1 million immigrants, 45 
percent of the immigrant population, became naturalized US citizens. Of that 18.1 
million, 47 percent have naturalized since 2000. However, as several countries’ 
immigrant populations increase, they are seeing a decline in the percent of their 
immigrant population seeking naturalization. Thus, even though on average OECD 
countries have a higher percentage of naturalizations, the percent of naturalizations as a 
percentage of the foreign populations is decreasing. For example in 2005 Austria’s 
naturalization rate as a percentage of their foreign population was 4.5 percent, but by 
2011 it had dropped to 0.7 percent. On the other hand, some countries have experienced 
fluctuations in their foreign population naturalizing Sweden, for instance, had a 
naturalization rate of 8.8 percent in 2000, which had fallen to 5.5 percent by 2010, but 
picked up to 5.8 percent in 2011 (OECD, 2013). Even as citizenship eligibility rises 
among established immigrants, the percentage of eligible immigrants who actually 
acquire citizenship is low because of the increasing requirements expected of applicants.  
Obtaining citizenship is considered an important part of the immigrant integration 
process (Freeman, 2004; Paxton & Mughan, 2005; Hochman, 2011). It provides 
immigrants access to full political and social rights, from which they were otherwise 
barred, and it proves the commitment and dedication to the country that immigrants are 
expected to demonstrate. The decision to naturalize from the migrant prospective is 
challenging, since one must weigh the advantages of becoming a naturalized citizen with 
the prospect of never migrating back to their homeland. In many instances, immigrants 
must choose to forsake their nationality of origin for their new citizenship; as many 
countries no longer allow dual citizenship (OECD, 2010). 
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In fact, the idea that a country may not allow dual citizenship, may add to the 
notion of “earning” ones right to citizenship. Countries generally do not forcibly require 
an immigrant to revoke their previous nationality if it could impose negative 
consequences on a migrant, and often make exceptions (Liebig, 2011). One might argue 
that these additions only further potential exclusionary migration politics and thus add to 
preventing social exclusion in liberal democracies is that countries would have to ensure 
citizenship as a universal entitlement (Farhendorf, 1985). A close illustration of this idea 
is the principle of being a citizen of the EU by way of being a citizen to a member state. 
Reducing duration of stay and relaxing the laws regarding where and to whom migrant 
(or migrant origin) children are born does not mask the fact that some countries’ 
naturalization criteria take a great deal of dedication.    
Individual countries have different criteria to access citizenship. For the most part, 
the applicant must be over 18 years old, unless applying for citizenship as a family, in 
which case minors apply under their parents, as is the case with the United States and 
Norway. The minimum duration of stay in the new country ranges from three years in 
Canada, Australia and Belgium to up to ten or twelve years in Italy, Austria and 
Switzerland. However, most countries’ minimum requirements fall between five and 
eight years. Swearing an oath to the country after being granted citizenship is popular. 
The oaths are typically pledges of allegiance to the country and its values. They usually 
end with a small reception meant to celebrate the new citizens’ achievement. Some 
countries do not have oaths, but will have a small celebration to honor those who took the 
necessary steps to become official citizens.   
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Additionally, several states have either language ability testing requirements or a 
minimum language proficiency that must be obtained in order to be naturalized. For 
instance, Canada, France and Germany have minimum levels of proficiency that 
immigrants must obtain prior to applying for citizenship. Immigrants must provide proper 
documentation with their application. The United States and Canada conduct their 
language test orally, where the migrant must be able to communicate effectively with the 
interviewer. Language is perceived to be an integral part of assimilation into a host 
country, socially and economically. Thus the inclusion of a language examination is a 
practical tool for assessing immigrants on the grounds that they understand the language 
and will be functioning members of society (Antonisch, 2012). 
Some countries provide language courses free or heavily subsidized. In Canada, 
all qualified adult permanent residents have the right to free language training, and this 
extends to those migrants who the government intends to grant permanent status to, 
namely family under family reunification, and asylum seekers.  The government works 
through provincial governments, school boards, community colleges and immigrant-
serving organizations to provide language courses. Canada offers the course in both 
English and French and migrants can also prove proficiency in their application by either 
proving English or French third-party qualifying examinations or a secondary degree in 
English or French as a the field of study (Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC], 
2012). Similar to Canada, the German system can require an immigrant to take language 
courses and which the local immigration office would determine when the migrant files 
for residency. The Department for Migration and Refugees of the German government 
subsidizes the language course for all migrants. Participants are only required to pay EUR 
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1,20 for every hour-long lesson, or EUR 792 for the 660 hour course provided by a third 
party language institute. Sixty of the 660 hours are dedicated to an integrations course, 
which goes over German laws, customs, rights and everyday life.  The course ends with 
an exam and, due to the citizenship language requirements, participants should aim to 
obtain a B1 level, which tests one’s ability to understand and communicate about 
everyday topics (work, school, free time activities), as well as describe experiences, 
hopes and dreams, and clearly express themself. If they are not able to achieve that level, 
they have the option to retake courses, but at the full price (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge [BAMF], 2011). The Norwegian system is only free for newly arrived 
refugees and family members granted family reunification. Their requirements include 
taking 550 hours of a language and 50 hours of Norwegian society class until one reaches 
at least a B1 on their language exam (Utlendingsdirektoratet, 2012) Other countries, like 
the United States, have no particular strategy and like the United States, delegate 
language programs to an array of institutions, like community colleges, private 
educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations, etc. (McHugh & Challinor, 
2011).  
A citizenship exam portion of the application has also become very common, as 
most countries require some knowledge of the laws and rights as citizens. The general 
content usually covers, but is not limited to, the country’s specific type of democracy, 
important dates in the country’s history, the rights granted to the citizens, laws and 
customs, etc. Governments will either provide applicants with material covering all the 
information they need to know for the exam, for example, the DVD “Pass the United 
States Citizenship Test and Interview (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
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(USCIS), 2013). Countries may also dedicate a part of the language courses to modules 
on citizenship, daily life, laws of the country. The courses are for immediate integration 
into the society, so when it comes to applying for citizenship, the migrant is well versed 
on how life in that country is.   
 Native-born citizens are very protective of their social rights, access to benefits 
and voting, and thus, can be very forthcoming in their frustration when they believe 
migrants are to be a burden on the welfare state. The Netherlands has a rather progressive 
policy that allows for non-naturalized migrants access to rights that are usually reserved 
only for naturalized citizens in other countries. Migrants are allowed to work in the civil 
service, except they cannot work for the police or military. They allow non-citizens who 
have legally resided in the Netherlands for at least five years the right to vote locally. 
Also, many municipal councils are ethnically diverse, including some members who are 
not Dutch citizens (Evanilli, 2007).  
Canada has three settlement programs: the Immigrant Settlement and Adaption 
Program (ISAP), which incorporates the Canadian Orientation Abroad (COA) and the 
Language Instruction for Newcomers (LINC) and the Host Program. Each program offers 
a variety of services to help orient migrants to Canadian way of life, learn the language 
and skills to find a job. ISAP distributes money to immigrant-serving organizations for 
the purpose of generally educating migrants on life in Canada, providing resources like 
counseling, employment guidance, and translation and interpretation to those with poor 
English or French skills. The COA falls beneath the ISAP, but it an orientation program 
for migrants in their countries of origin. LINC provides free language training course in 
English or French to all adult newcomers. Finally the Host Program pairs immigrants 
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with Canadian volunteers, who will help with the integration process by instructing 
immigrants on additional community resources and activities, giving the immigrant an 
opportunity to further practice their English or French with a native speaker. The most 
important features of the Host Program is its dedication to promoting inclusion of 
immigrants into society as well as to cultivate cross-cultural friendships (Elrick, 2010; 
CIC, 2012). 
In the United States immigration policy, only naturalized citizens are fully eligible 
for all public benefits. These include: Medicaid, Medicare, the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), cash assistance and Supplement 
Security Income (SSI) and Social Security. However, the United States’s welfare system 
has a means-tested welfare and a hidden welfare state component. For a citizen to be 
eligible for any welfare benefits must be well below the poverty line and the hidden 
welfare state materializes in the form of tax breaks. A legal permanent resident must wait 
five years to be eligible for these benefits. Currently there are 40 million immigrants in 
the United States, which is 12.9 percent of the population and 43.8 percent of the 40 
million are naturalized citizens. Additionally, refugee and asylum seekers only receive 
benefits if they meet the program requirement (Ku & Bruen, 2013).  
Many Americans believe that immigrant families are freeloading off of the 
government, but that is no necessarily the case. Children born in the United States to 
immigrant parents are entitled to welfare benefits; however, the government only pays for 
the costs incurred by the child. So yes, immigrant families can get benefits, but it is 
through the citizenship of a child, and the assistance they receive only covers that child. 
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Furthermore, temporary workers, students and undocumented migrants are not eligible 
for any benefits or social rights, but they will pay taxes in the forms of excise and sales 
taxes, property taxes as part of their rent and if they work they will pay local, state, 
federal taxes. Ku and Bruen of the CATO Institute found that overall immigrants use less 
benefits than natives. They shifted their focus to only low-income natives and eligible 
migrants because of the means tested welfare system and only they are eligible for it. The 
cost of benefits usage for immigrant adults is 42 percent below the cost of the natives and 
the cost of immigrant children are 66 percent below that of their native counterpart (Ku & 
Bruen, 2013).  
   
III. Resentment and Misconceptions 
“The dominant explanation of popular hostility to immigrants is realistic group 
conflict theory, which holds that immigrants are resented for threatening natives’ 
economic and material interests in the form of jobs, crime, education and taxation 
(Blumer, 1958; Hardin 1995)” (as cited from Paxton & Mughan, 2006). In a study on the 
positive determinant of naturalization in Germany, Oshrat Hochman (2011) found that 
discrimination does indeed lower odds of naturalization. It was not until recently that 
anti-discrimination laws began debuting on an international level. After the Amsterdam 
Treaty in 1997, the EU began an anti-discrimination campaign. It sought to make 
mandatory directives for member states to begin implementing new anti-discrimination 
programs and policies (Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006). This was during a shift in 
politics from ‘socially exclusive ’, blocking immigrants from participating in their rights, 
to ‘socially inclusive’, or rights that kept individuals from being marginalized and 
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ensured opportunity and resources to participate economically, socially and culturally. 
The social dilemma in Europe is how to effectively update old policies to better 
incorporate, but not marginalize, the inflow of migrants into European societies without 
disrupting the traditions and customs of the majority (Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006). 
Resistance to immigrants is still shared by approximately half of the European population 
today (Coenders, Lubbers & Scheepers, 2003) and is illustrated in public opinion and 
institutions. Often, this resistance causes ethnic tensions and conflicts, for example in 
France. It also caused several right-wing political movements in Europe over the last 
decade. It appears that the old racist, xenophobic and misinformed opinions have 
resurfaced. 
 Although the United States is a country built by immigrants, its immigration 
policies and political parties seem to contradict this origin. American nativism, or “the 
intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign (“un-American”) 
connections” (Higham, 1988; 4) has displayed at various times in the history a deep-
rooted xenophobic political agenda. Nativist groups saw characteristics in foreign 
enclaves that made Americans believe they would fail to assimilate.  There are three 
important themes that play a central role in nativism. First, the anti-Catholic “Know 
Nothing” Party of the 1850s viewed catholic immigrants as agents of the pope, there to 
undermine the liberal democracy and institutions. Claiming Catholicism lacked the 
ability to blend with the American concept of individual freedoms, the Know Nothing 
Party worked on excluding Catholics from the political arena by restricting naturalization 
laws. Second, immigrants defecting to the US were coming from countries facing 
political and socio-economic change, spawning an anti-radicalism sentiment. During this 
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time, revolutions were fought on the principles of political and social change, which 
contrasted with the American revolutionists who fought only for the political change. The 
third theme started as Americans began defining the American identity with an 
unquestioned assumption of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. The Anglo-
American culture thus came to embody and conform to this identity of superiority 
(Higham, 1988). 
Nativism was really racism in disguise. During the periods of high nativism, a lot 
of restrictive and discriminatory policies were created in the United States. Policies like 
the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, which empowered the President to deport migrants 
on the grounds that they were threats to the American government. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 legalized discrimination, and restricted legal naturalization to the 
Chinese. These acts and behaviors led to the introduction of mandatory literacy tests, 
which disenfranchised the African Americans. Today, there have been recent resurgences 
of nativism in state immigration laws, especially in states with high Hispanic populations 
in the Southwest. In 1994, the Republican governor of California supported Proposition 
187, which sought to strip education and health privileges away from migrant children in 
California and force all social agencies to check the legal status of migrants upon 
administering any assistance (Migration News, 1994; Zolberg & Long, 1999). 
Californian voters passed this proposition, but by 1999 it was removed. In 1996, the 
federal government passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). The PRA defined and restricted non-citizen eligibility to 
benefits and services provided by the local, state and federal level. The IIRAIA aimed to 
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strengthen security at the southern border and define new protocols and penalties for 
employment verification. Similarly in 2012, after surviving a Supreme Court Challenge, 
Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 has one provision that allows police officers to check an 
individual’s immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion the individual is an illegal 
immigrant (Cohen & Mears, 2012). This law essentially gives police the opportunity to 
racially profile migrants in the state of Arizona. The recently proposed immigration bill 
became a source of contention between the two parties in the US Senate. However, the 
Tea Party Republicans have been the most outspoken. They are working to dismiss the 
bill due to the proposed section on the “pathway to citizenship” for illegal immigrants. 
The Tea Party Republicans believe that by passing this law, the United States would be 
rewarding illegal immigrants for breaking laws (Miron, 2013). 
Could the US Republican Party faction, the Tea Party, be a relative of the radical 
right-wing populist parties that immerged during In Europe in the mid 80’s and 90’s? 
Radical right-wing populist parties reject the establishment of a socio-cultural and 
political system. They believe in the classic liberal free market, reduced roll of 
government and criticize high taxes. “They are right wing in their rejection of individual 
and social equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups 
and their appeal to xenophobia” (Betz, 1993; 414). The immigrant inflow into Western 
Europe over the last fifty years has changed the demographic composition of Europe, that 
by the end of the 1980s and well into the 1990s, more Europeans where describing 
themselves as racist. In a 1989 study on racism and xenophobia, between 11 and 14 
percent of Europeans were “concerned about the presence of people of different races, 
religions and nationalities” (Betz, 1993; 414). Later in 1997, the European Commission 
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conducted a surveys that’s results revealed a third of the of respondents openly 
considered themselves “quite” or “very racist”, of that third, 9 percent considered 
themselves “very racist”. Of the respondents from Belgium, France and Austria, 22, 16 
and 14 percent respectively, considered themselves “very racist (Eurobarometer, 1997).  
An environment such as this led to the success of the right-wing populist parties 
gaining seats in European governments. To Betz, the parties’ successes “mark the revival 
of racism” (Betz 1993; 388). Several European countries had prominent radical right-
wing political parties. After Italy’s Lega Lombarda success in 1990, the party merged 
with similar parties in Northern Italy and became Italy’s fourth largest party in 1992.  
Austria’s FPÖ (Freedom Party) was successful in capturing thirty-three seats in 
Parliament in 1990.  France’s Front National gained traction throughout the 1980s, 
getting 9.6 percent of the vote in the 1988 national elections. Belgium’s Vlaams Blok had 
twelve parliamentary seats in 1991, ten more than in 1987. However, Vlaams Bloc 
became Vlaams Belang after being convicted for being racist and was forced to disband 
in 2004 (BBC, 2004). Germany’s Republikaner faired much better in the state elections 
in Baden-Württemberg than nationally after reunification. Most surprising were the 
parties that had successes in Scandinavia with Sweden’s Ny Demokrati and Denmark’s 
and Norway’s Progress Party. These parties were successful at attracting an electorate, 
however there was an overrepresentation of lower middle class blue-collar workers. 
Some parties, like Austria’s FPÖ and the Norway’s Progress Party also attracted some 
young, white-collar male voters. Vlaams Blok’s and Republikaner’s supporters were 
typically poorly educated, blue-collar workers. Workers who found themselves 
marginalized by modernization and globalization traditionally supported right-wing 
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populist parties. These right-wing parties also appealed to young professionals and recent 
graduates, who find no prospects in the labor market due to deteriorating economic 
conditions (Betz; 1993). 
Ideologically, the Tea Party resembles a radical, right wing populist party. 
Members believe in low taxation rate, limited government regulation and spending, and a 
free market—a mixture of Republican and Libertarian ideals. They are apprehensive of a 
Democratic-led government, as they believe their personal well-being and economic 
wealth are at stake. However, the demographics of the Tea Party tend to be wealthier and 
better educated than the general public. They are typically married, white males who are 
over the age of 45 (New York Times & CBS News Poll, 2010). Taking that into 
consideration, their objection to the “pathway to citizenship” section of the immigration 
bill, while expressing no concern for the increase in spending from an increase in border 
security, seems increasingly more reminiscent of an anti-immigrant, nativist sentiment. 
Most resentment towards immigrants in America is in regards to the 11 million illegal 
immigrants. The largest population represented is Hispanics, which are largely located in 
the Southwest and Florida. Many Americans perceive Hispanics in the United States to 
be unwilling or unable to assimilate (Huntington, 2004). The primary use of foreign 
language usage, namely Spanish, affects the public’s perception on Hispanics ability to 
assimilate. In the United States, it is required that election ballots are available in Spanish 
and there has also been an increase in Spanish media and bilingual school programs 
which have all contributed to heightening the monolingual American’s negative 
perceptions. Even though Spanish is still the most popular foreign language in high 
schools, the language is apparently the crux of Hispanics inability to assimilate. There is 
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a belief that due to the resources available in Spanish, immigrating Hispanics lack the 
responsibility to learn English. As language is such an important part of culture, 
Americans expect migrants to learn, speak and appreciate the English language. When 
migrants abstain from learning English, it becomes clear that the migrants are not 
assimilating.  
The incorporation of Muslims in Europe is similar to the incorporation of 
Hispanics in the United States, except, instead of language, the issues revolve around 
religion. For centuries, religion and culture have been intertwined. Recently governments 
and courts around the world have questioned the relationship due to changing 
demographics. Simply, culture is a way of life. It is a way that a people live. Religion is 
the belief in a set of moral codes and how those codes guide followers (Joppke & Torpey, 
2013). After hundreds of years of relative isolation, it is evident religion can define a 
people’s identity, thus highlighting Europe’s struggle with the inclusion of Muslims 
migrants and the threat it poses ultimately on its Christian identity.  
Due to the large immigrant populations of non-Christians moving into Europe, 
governments have created policies which either socially include or socially exclude 
migrants. Countries with multiculturalism tendencies tend to support policies aimed at 
ensuring religious freedom by recognizing religious equality. These countries allow the 
universalistic and inclusive sentiment guide their social rights. Canada, which is deeply 
committed to its multicultural integration policy, has faced minor issues in incorporating 
Muslims. However, the percent of Muslim migrants to Canada remains small compared 
to Europe (Joppke & Torpey, 2013). Sweden is the most tolerant in Europe with the most 
open immigration and multicultural integration policies. After two years of legal 
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residence, the Swedish government awards immigrants same social and some of the same 
political rights as natives. Swedes are also the most supportive of the idea of ‘granting 
rights immediately to immigrants without prior contributions’ (OECD, 2013).  
Under laïcité, the separation of church and state, devoutly secular France 
established all religions equal. In 2003 the French Council on the Muslim Religion finally 
succeeded at getting Islam recognized as an equal to established religions in France 
(Engler, 2007; Joppke & Torpey, 2013). In 2004, as an attempt to further their secular 
ideals, France moved to ban all religious symbols in public institutions—schools, 
government buildings and hospitals. This ultimately meant no crucifixes, no stars of 
David, no kippahs (commonly known as yamakas), and no headscarves, thus removing 
all religions from the public sphere. The most controversial French law reagrding religion 
was passed in 2010, which banned the public adornment of all headgear that would cover 
the face. This was perceived as a direct attack on the Muslim Burqa (Antonsich, 2012; 
Joppke & Torpey, 2013). It appears that France tried to make everyone equal, but in the 
process, stripped many people of their religious identity.  
Where France’s issues spawn from “social inclusion”, Germany’s are predominately 
“exclusive”. The rejection of multiculturalism in Germany has effected the establishment 
of Turkish Islamic immigrant institutions and has stunted their role in the German 
society. Germany does not to recognize Islam as a church under its “constitutional law of 
religion” (Religionsverfassungsrecht). In order to collect church taxation benefits, receive 
any kind of state subsidy for religious or cultural activities, or be able to teach religion in 
the school curriculum, churches must be granted “corporation under public law” 
(Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts) (Doomernick, 2007; Joppke & Torpey, 2013). To 
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date, Islam still has not been granted this status. In response, Turkish Migrant Umbrella 
Organizations (TMUOs) were organizations formed to preserve and protect the Turkish 
culture through religious or political action, as well as promote the interests of their 
members. Two thirds of the TMUOs support the integration of Turkish Muslims into 
German society by means of educating its members on the German culture and 
Germnay’s political and legal systems (Doomernick, 2007). 
There are differences between Islam in Europe and Islam in North America. 
European governments are trying to incorporate a religion, while North America is 
integrating immigrants. Although an important distinction must be made: the 
Muslim immigrants in Europe verses in North America are not inherently the same. 
The small populations of Muslim immigrants in North America fare well. They 
integrate with little, if not any help from government. They integrate through 
society and the labor force, they have comparatively high economic and educational 
status, and on average are better educated and earn higher wages than most North 
Americans. Europe, in comparison, has a large, low educated and low skilled 
population of Muslim immigrants, creating a socio-demographic issue (Joppke & 
Torpey, 2013). Europe has claimed to not be region of migrants, but the immigrant 
populations have not stopped growing since World War II. It has only been within 
the last decade that migrants have been referred to by their religion as opposed to 
their origin. In France, Moroccans and Algerians were foreign workers or their 
post-colonial immigrants. In Germany, Turkish migrants were guest workers or 
Turks. In the United States, Muslims were either African or Arab immigrants, but 
often the Arabs in Los Angeles and Detroit were actually Christians. After the 
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terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001, Muslims became identifiable by their 
religion, as opposed to their nationality (Joppke & Torpey, 2013).  This undeniable 
stereotyping of the Islamic religion by western cultures has caused an increase of tension 
and discrimination.  
The European Union’s first major breakthrough in developing policy to deal with 
migration, integration, xenophobia and discrimination came with the passing of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. Article 13 is an anti-discrimination policy designed to 
combat discrimination and xenophobia. Under this article, the European Monitoring 
Center for Discrimination and Xenophobia was created. It was replaced in 2007 by the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), which uses data from EU 
countries to help EU members and institutions confront the issues they face in ensuring 
fundamental rights to everyone (FRA, 2012). The ultimate goal of the anti-discrimination 
policy is to ensure formal and substance rights, and equality to migrants and naturalized 
citizens. Although these groups may be entitled to certain rights and benefits by law, but 
in the face of discrimination and racism, they may not be able to enjoy them as a native 
citizen does (Schierup, Hansen & Castels, 2006). Over the last decade, there have been 
some improvements in anti-discrimination legislation, illustrated by the creation of laws 
on the national level.  
For example, the 1976 Race Relations Bill in the UK had expanded the definition 
of discrimination. It included direct and indirect discrimination, which considered 
conditions that may be non-discriminatory, but penalize members of racial groups 
disproportionately. However, the Race Relations Act of 2000 took it further by extending 
the anti-discrimination policies to all public bodies, and emphasized a ‘general duty’ on 
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authorities to strive for the elimination of discrimination and promote equality of 
opportunity (Hansen, 2007). In 2006, France passed the Law of Equal Opportunities (loi 
our l’égalité des chances) to help combat the discrimination against immigrants and 
improve opportunities for the marginalized immigrants living the city suburbs (banlieue). 
Programs were created to promote education and access to the labor market, especially 
for youth with migrant or disadvantaged backgrounds (Engler, 2007). But unfortunately, 
the laws cannot easily change individuals’ personal opinion on immigrants and race 
relations. 
Despite the efforts to reduce discrimination, the 1997 Eurobarometer Opinion Poll 
no. 47.1 discovered that many of the respondents who declared themselves as racists 
were actually xenophobic. In fact, 35 percent of the respondents admitted to being at least 
“quite racist”. Regardless, over 90 percent of respondents believe in ‘equality before the 
law’ and ‘rights to education and training’ should be respected in all circumstances. In 
addition, 80 percent added the right to ‘legal protection against discrimination’, ‘to live 
with one’s family’, ‘to housing’, ‘to owns language and culture’, ‘to religion liberty and 
conscience’ and ‘freedom of speech’.  On average 70 percent believed that minority 
groups were discriminated against in the job market. The results of the Eurobarometer 
393 on Discrimination in the EU in 2012 revealed 56 percent of the respondents believed 
that discrimination on the grounds of “ethnic origin” in the labor market was 
“widespread” or prevalent today—a 6 percent decrease since 2009. It’s followed closely 
by disability and sexual orientations with 46 percent each, while religion is much lower 
with 39 percent. Furthermore, 17 percent of respondents have experienced 
discrimination, which remains fairly constant with the 16 percent in 2009. Of the 17 
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percent, 13 percent have been discriminated against on one ground presented by the 
Eurobarometer and 4 percent on multiple grounds. Also, 27 percent of respondents who 
say they belong to a minority group are more likely than Europeans on average to report 
that they have personally experienced discrimination. The perceived discrimination in 
everyday life is comparatively much lower than in the labor force. Discrimination on the 
grounds of “ethnic origin” is 47 percent and “religion” is 33 percent. Those who 
perceived discrimination of ethnic origin or religion to be “widespread” were most likely 
those who had personally experienced or witnessed discrimination, belonged a minority, 
were young, were left of the political spectrum, have completed more education, had a 
diverse social circle and had foreign born parents (Eurobarometer 393, 2012). 
Individual opinions in member states varied in their responses concerning how 
widespread discrimination is on the grounds of “ethnic origin.” The numbers range from 
26 percent in Latvia and Poland to 75 and 76 percent in Sweden and France, with 
Germany and the UK in the middle with 51 and 57 percent, respectively. On the grounds 
of religion, however, there is a much bigger gap because so many view the discrimination 
to be ‘rare’ or ‘non-existent’. For instance, in the Czech Republic 80 percent believe that 
discrimination of the basis of religion is rare, compared to 10 percent who believe it is 
widespread.  In France, 66 percent believe it is widespread and 28 percent believe it is 
rare. The most significant part is that overall, only 2 percent believe that discrimination 
based on “ethnic origin” is non-existent and 5 percent based on “religion”. The numbers 
suggest that discrimination in the workplace and in everyday life still prevail 
(Eurobarometer 393, 2012). 
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Immigrants face a vicious cycle in a new country. They must be employed to 
ensure financial stability to gain the communities’ trust as a functioning and productive 
member of society, and to demonstrate their ability to support a family when they apply 
for citizenship. At the same time, they are often discriminated in the work force, are often 
overqualified for their jobs and have to compete with natives for the same jobs. Low 
skill, low educated migrants are often employed in dirty, dangerous and demeaning jobs 
for long hours with low wages (Stalker, 2008). Furthermore, natives often negatively 
stereotype all immigrants to be undocumented migrants. They assume that immigrants do 
not pay taxes, live off only welfare benefits, thus, are burdens to society. Depending on 
the country, immigrants may be awarded social rights within the first year and political 
rights after about five years, or they may not get any rights until they are naturalized 
citizens. They can be governmental taxes, which include the social security payments, 
property, city, state, federal taxes, or they impose excise and sales taxes on consumer 
goods. Thus migrants do pay taxes and if migrants are in the country illegally, they are 
paying in some form of tax.  
 
Conclusion 
The integration of immigrants has proven to be challenging for both government 
and society. On one hand nations would like to judge the success of their integration 
policy by the extent to which migrants incorporate themselves into society without 
society changing. But “[informal] multiculturalism is less a choice than an unintended 
and often most unwelcome outcome” (Freeman 2000; 961), which hints at the fact that 
incorporation may work best when there are mutual concessions and compromises. This 
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disconnect between the expectations and realities of incorporation perpetuates these 
issues. In societies that emphasize the importance of assimilation, natives have an 
unrealistic goal for first generation migrants. There is an expectation to assimilate 
linguistically, behaviorally, culturally, and sometimes religiously is greater than migrants 
are capable of complying.  
This has a lot to do with the change in composition of migrants over the past few 
decades. The migrants who countries want likely do not match those whom they 
ultimately get. Due to transportation advancements, countries have less control over who 
arrives than they did sixty years ago. At that time, migrants were often still arriving 
slowly by sea, but now people can travel faster for little money. Regardless of public 
opposition to rising immigration, there is a constant need for immigrant workers in 
growing economies. They are needed to fill the undesirable jobs and industries in which 
natives will not work, to cushion replacement rates, and to help pay for the welfare states.  
Ultimately as immigration rates continue to rise, natives tolerate only certain 
types of immigrants. Generally, they do not like undocumented migrants, as they are 
perceived to lower the wages of native citizens, to not assimilate and to not pay taxes. 
Similarly, higher inflows of asylum seekers are associated with negative reactions from 
natives. The general wish to decrease the admittance of asylum seekers does not stem 
from humanitarian concerns, but instead from the perception that refugees are too 
dependent on government support (Mayda, 2006). Governments continuously try to 
attract highly skilled, highly educated migrants even though low educated migrants 
outnumber them. Overall, however, the number of highly educated migrants is 
increasing. In 2005, 26 million migrants in OECD countries held a university degree, 
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while 5.2 million held tertiary degrees (Widmaier & Dumont, 2011). On average, 29 
percent of immigrants in the OECD have tertiary degrees, compared to only 24 percent of 
native-born (OECD, 2013). Unfortunately, 30 percent of migrants have jobs for which 
they are grossly overqualified. All in all, there is a substantial increase in highly educated 
immigrants, as they tend to stay in the new country longer and are more likely to 
naturalize (Hochman, 2011).  
In fact, it is sometimes easier to migrate within the OECD for migrants who are 
highly skilled or highly educated. Citizens of the EU member nations enjoy the freedom 
of movement and employment within the Schengen Zone. There is also an initiative of 
the EU to attract highly educated, highly skilled workers from non-EU nations. With a 
valid work contract from an employer in a EU member state, migrants are issued the “EU 
Blue card”, allowing them to live and work in Europe. On a global level, temporary study 
and work visas are good ways to increase the number of highly skilled, highly educated 
migrants in OECD countries. These visas are not only growing in popularity, but 
governments with quotas are also increasing the numbers available. Unfortunately, the 
conditions and constraints of temporary visas and discrimination agiainst migrants in the 
labor market often force these migrants to return home.  
Language acquisition is highly regarded as a crucial part of assimilation.  
Unfortunately, the difficulty of this process is widely underestimated. States that provide 
proficient language courses make incorporation easier for immigrants. Immigrant groups 
who refuse to speak the native language are inevitably considered as “unable to 
assimilate” (Huntington, 2004). The acquisition of the host country’s language allows 
immigrants to communicate with the community around them, and provides them with 
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the opportunity to advance in their careers. Large portions of under-educated migrants 
arriving in OECD countries have little or no required language skills. The length of time 
required to acquire proficiency in a second language depends on a number of factors. 
When the individual’s starting level is low, it takes longer to become acquainted with the 
second language. Second languages with the same writing system as the native language 
are easier to learn, but, learning a new writing system requires more time and dedication 
such, Latin, Greek or the Cyrillic alphabet, or Chinese logographics, or even Arabic 
Abjads. The manner in which a language is taught and the design of the course can affect 
how one learns the language. Individualized learning is the most effective, but also the 
most expensive. Classroom courses can have an overwhelming student to teacher ratio, 
subjecting students to minimal individualized attention. An important part of learning a 
second language is the dedication to learning, using and practicing it outside the course; 
the more an individual maximizes outside learning, the easier the language becomes. 
Finally, there is the dilemma of the opportunity cost of whether an immigrant is able to 
sacrifice enough time off from work to learn the native language and whether the 
government provides any financial support to help migrants afford the costs of t acquiring 
the second languages. For countries that require a minimum achieved language level, it 
could take anywhere from three months to a year to achieve even the basics. The 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEF) is an outline of 
language proficiency requirements, where levels A1 and A2 are recognized as basic 
users, B1 and B2 as independent users, and C1 and C2 as proficient users (Council of 
Europe, 2000). 
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Do natives truly believe migrants have assimilated or do they continually project 
their fears on new migrant groups and become “immune” to previous migrants? The fact 
that integration and naturalization policy reflects more of the natives’ opinions on how 
integration should be conducted—demanding language, citizenship and cultural exams, 
oaths to the nation, and declining applications of dual citizenship—it is no wonder that 
some countries have less naturalization than others. Being the most open in terms of 
immigration and integration policy, Sweden has a fairly high percentage of their foreign 
population naturalizing, in comparison to the falling naturalization rates of countries with 
more rigorous policies in countries such as Austria and Germany (OECD, 2013). 
Governments supporting the incorporation of to immigrants into society do so by 
granting them access to the government through denizen rights, providing greater access 
to the labor market, and protecting immigrants under anti-discrimination policy, and 
easing the naturalization policy induces migrants to naturalize. Just as natives want 
immigrants to feel a sense of loyalty and belonging to the country, immigrants want to 
feel accepted and to be a part of society. Given time, immigrants will assimilate. 
Research suggests that not only do immigrants assimilate after living in the host state 
over a long period of time, but also that they are assimilating at measurably faster rates 
(Vigdor, 2008). Notably, the Chicago School of Sociology believes that “at least three 
generations are necessary for immigrants to become fully assimilated Americans” 
(Ireland, 2004; 4). However, increased deterioration to the earlier forms of assimilation 
and unresolved issues in incorporating Hispanics in the United States and Muslims in 
Europe have only led to more conflict, discrimination and xenophobia. Thus making it 
increasingly more difficult for new groups of migrants to openly renounce their 
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nationalities for societies that seem to not want them. Each country discussed has unique 
internal factors governing the success of immigrant incorporation. Although there are 
similarities among countries’ policies, countries are dealing with different groups of 
immigrants with different skill sets and different reasons for immigrating. The 
relationship between the similarities and differences provide researchers the necessary 
data to find ample trends in the immigrant incorporation across countries.  
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